IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No 5708 of 2005

For Approval and Signature:

HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE J.R.VORA

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1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgements? : YES

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? : NO

3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgement? : NO

4. Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 of any Order made thereunder? : NO

5. Whether it is to be circulated to the concerned Magistrate/Magistrates,Judge/Judges,Tribunal/Tribunals? : NO

JILUBAHEN INKLABBHAI KURESHI

Versus

STATE OF GUAJRAT

Appearance:

MS SUBHADRA G PATEL for Petitioner

MR IM PANDYA AGP for Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE J.R.VORA

Date of decision: 28/04/2005

ORAL JUDGEMENT

1. This Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner challenging her detention in pursuance of the

order passed against her by Police Commissioner, Rajkot City, on 27th of February, 2005, in exercise of powers conferred upon him under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act for short). The petitioner is under detention as bootlegger from 27th of February, 2005 in pursuance of the above order.

2. The grounds of detention as placed on record reveal that the detaining authority took into consideration two types of materials to arrive at the subjective satisfaction. Firstly, the detaining authority took into consideration seven criminal cases registered against the petitioner under the Bombay Prohibition Act. Secondly, the detaining authority took into consideration two in-camera statements, as recorded by the sponsoring authority on 23rd of February, 2005 as verified by the detaining authority on 24th of February, 2005. The identity of the witnesses is not disclosed by the detaining authority, claiming privilege under Section 9(2) of the PASA Act.

3. Out of seven cases registered against the petitioner, all came to be registered before 'B' Division Police Station, Rajkot, on 20th of June, 2002, 28th of January 2003, 28th of January, 2003, 28th of January, 2003, 31st of July, 2003, 5th of June, 2004 and on 12th of February,2005. In each of this seven cases, it was alleged that the petitioner was found in possession of some bottles of prohibited foreign liquor. The detaining authority considered exhaustively and thoroughly the investigation papers in all the seven cases.

4. Out of two in-camera statements, first witness referred to an incident of 19th of December, 2004, wherein at about 10.00 a.m. one boy hired the passenger rickshaw of the witness and took him to the residence of the petitioner. At the instance of the petitioner, two accomplices of the petitioner carried two crates containing prohibited foreign liquor and placed it in the rickshaw. The witness refused to transport the said prohibited liquor in his rickshaw and thereby the petitioner and her accomplices were got excited and started abusing the witness. So, the witness stated that if he was harassed by them, he would be constrained to file complaint against them with the police. Thereupon, accomplices of the petitioner were more excited and started beating the witness. One accomplice took out a knife and threatened the witness that if he dared to file complaint against them with the police, he would be done to death. The witness was frightened and raised shouts

for help, which attracted a crowd, but none-dared to intervene. On the contrary, the petitioner and his accomplices rushed towards the crowd with weapons, so people started running helter - skelter and atmosphere of fear was spread. By act of supplication, the witness could escape himself and public order was disturbed. The second witness referred to an incident of 21st of February, 2005, wherein at about 5.00 p.m. male accomplices of the petitioner boarded in the rickshaw of the witness with prohibited liquor and directed the witness to take the rickshaw behind the bus stand. Witness knew that the accomplices of the petitioner were carrying prohibited liquor along with them and, therefore, he refused to give rickshaw on hire. Therefore, those accomplices started abusing the witness. The witness stated that if he was harassed by them, he would be constrained to call police to provide information about the activities of the petitioner. The accomplices of the petitioner called the petitioner at the spot. All of them started abusing and beating the witness. All the accomplices took out the knife and threatened the witness that if the witness dared to provide any information to the police about them, he would be done to death. The witness was frightened and raised shouts for help, which attracted the crowd, but the accomplices and the petitioner rushed towards the crowd with weapons, so the people started running helter skelter. The public order was disturbed.

5. Relying upon the above materials, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner was dealing in storing, selling and transporting the country liquor and was harassing innocent citizens, who became obstacles in executing her illegal activities of selling prohibited liquor. In view of the detaining authority, the petitioner was bootlegger within the meaning of the PASA Act. The detaining authority came to the conclusion that the bootlegging activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health and required to be prevented forthwith. After considering the other remedies available against the petitioner under the general law, the detaining authority reached to the subjective satisfaction that there was no other alternative except to detain the petitioner under the PASA Act. The detaining authority therefore passed the order of detention, as aforesaid, which is under challenge in this petition.

6. Learned Advocate Ms.Subhadra G Patel for the petitioner and learned AGP Mr.I.M.Pandya for the respondents were heard at length. The affidavit-in-reply

filed by the detaining authority as placed on record is also taken into consideration.

7. Out of various grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner and opposed and controverted by learned AGP, it appears that this petition can be examined and disposed of only on the issue that whether there was credible and cogent material placed before the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that by the activities of the petitioner, the public order was disturbed and public health was adversely affected.

8. To reach to the subjective satisfaction that the bootlegging activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health, the detaining authority must rely upon credible and cogent material indicating that the activities of the detenu directly or indirectly were causing or were likely to cause harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or the public health. While undertaking this exercise, the detaining authority has to draw a clear line between the cases falling within the category of breach of law and order and the cases falling within the category of breach of public order.

9. Referring to the seven criminal cases filed against the petitioner under the Bombay Prohibition Act for the possession of prohibited liquor and going through the investigation papers as placed on record, it is found that those seven cases came to be filed against the detenu because she was dealing in prohibited liquor. The possession of prohibited liquor is a breach under the Bombay Prohibition Act and hence cases came to be filed. However, merely filing cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act would not result in a conclusion that the activities of the petitioner were disturbing the public order or was affecting adversely to the public health. At the most, the petitioner might have committed breach of the provisions of law, for which the petitioner may be tried and punished if found guilty, but surely the act constituting the offence in dealing in prohibited liquor cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community nor the activities revealed through the investigating papers indicate that in the activities alleged through these cases, society at large or section of the society or community or particular community was involved. Therefore, these cases may be instances of breach of law and order, but cannot be branded as activities disturbing the public order or affecting the

public health.

10. Further while referring to the in-camera statements, as recorded by the sponsoring authority and verified by the detaining authority, it must be borne in mind that while reaching to the subjective satisfaction about the alleged activities of the petitioner, it would be necessary for the detaining authority to consider fall out, reach and impact of the activities of the petitioner and thereafter to come to the conclusion that such activities were capable of disturbing the public order. Two incidents, as narrated through in-camera statements, reveal individual disputes than to involve society at large or even disturbing the even tempo of the life of the community. The potentiality of the act alleged through in-camera statements, even from the bare reading of them, are not capable of disturbing the even tempo of life of the community or society at large or section of the society. No widespread danger or harm to the society could be inferred from the statements of the witnesses. Therefore, even after taking them on their face value, those incidents, may be instances of disturbing law and order, which can be taken care of by general law and by no stretch of reasoning, such activities can be branded to be disturbing the public order or affecting adversely to the public health.

11. In the matter of ASHOKBHAI JIVRAJ @ JIVABHAI SOLANKI vs. POLICE COMMISSIONER, SURAT and Ors. as reported in 2000 (1) GLH 393. The Division Bench of this Court after considering many decisions of the Apex Court, observed in paras 20 and 21 as under :

"20 The Division Bench then considered the law laid down by the Apex Court in Piyush Kantilal v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, AIR 1989 SC 491 and Two. Devaki vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 SC 1086. In Piyush Kantilal, similar circumstances were before the detaining authority and it was alleged that detention of the detenu was necessary in order to prevent activities of the detenu in maintenance of public order. Similarly in Two. Devaki, panic amongst people in the hall in which the incident took place and in nearby vicinity was highlighted. It was also alleged that people were scared and had run helter-skelter. In spite of such allegations, the Supreme Court held that they were not cases of maintenance of public order and hence, no action of preventive detention was uncalled for.

21. The Division Bench, following the above cases, observed that in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the selective phrases in the statements would not take out the case from maintenance of law and order to that of maintenance of public order and as power of detention, could not be used for maintenance of law and order, but only for public order, the order of detention made in such circumstances could not be upheld.

Again in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and Others, 1995 (2) GLR 1268 (Sc), the Supreme Court considered the relevant decisions on point including the decisions in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1979 (1) SCC 98 and held that stray incidents would not affect "public order" and order of detention cannot be passed in such cases."

12. The present set of facts are squarely covered by the above decision of this Court in the case of Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki (supra) and therefore the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in respect of disturbance of public order by the alleged activities of the petitioner cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. The order under challenge, therefore, is required to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone.

13. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order passed by the Police Commissioner, Rajkot City, on 27th of February, 2005, against the petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 3(1) of the PASA Act is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu - Jiluben Inklabbhai Kureshi is hereby ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if she is not required to be detained in jail for any other purpose. Rule made absolute. DS permitted.

(J.R. Vora, J.)